Early modern European antiquarians made plenty of blunders-but they were such interesting blunders. 1 In the rst third of the fteenth century, for example, Italian scholars developed a uid and legible handwriting based on the manuscripts of classical texts that they had found in monastic libraries. 2 They then instructed painters to adorn the initial letters and page borders of their own books with crawling, interlocking growths of vine, curling white stems and shoots, much like those they had seen in the old books. An initial E from a Bolognese manuscript of Suetonius, datable to the middle of the fteenth century, adorning a text written in a round humanist hand, is a good example ( g. 1). 3 But the white vine scroll and the minuscule alphabet were born of a chronological misconception, for the ancient models that scribes and painters looked to were not so ancient. Their models were actually twelfthcentury Italian manuscripts which in turn transmitted interlaced forms developed in transalpine monasteries such as St. Gall between the ninth and eleventh centuries; for example an initial C from a Homiliary, an Italian manuscript of the early twelfth century ( g. 2) . 4 There can be no mistake about the derivation, for fteenth-century white vine ornament duplicated even the blue, green, and red color scheme of the intervals between the vines found in the medieval sources. 5 The philologists in their enthusiasm were reviving not an ancient Roman but an early medieval and northern European form.
An art historian might describe such a cross-wiring as a pseudomorphosis, following Erwin Panofsky, who used this term to characterize a The Credulity Problem Christopher S. Wood historical form invested by Renaissance artists with a meaning that it had not possessed in the past. 6 White vine ornament and other false antiquities were not the fantasms of mere ill-informed artists, however. They were promulgated by scholars, the pioneers of the modern disciplines of philology and archaeology, critical minds who de ned themselves as the enemies of all hopeful or blurry thinking about the past. Just as the reform-minded theologians of the day deplored superstition and the cult of relics, so too did new-model historians ridicule the credulities of unlettered clerics, professorial imposters, and the common folk. In his Bavarian Chronicle of 1526 the historian Johann Aventinus-to invoke only one distinguished gure-drily mocked the "good, foolish, and ignorant cathedral canon" in Regensburg who on the basis of an inscription mistook the tombstone of Aurelia, a Roman woman, for the tomb of a certain Saint Aurelia, who in fact there was no reason to believe had ever been in Regensburg. 7 The local cleric, untutored in epigraphy and archaeology, had no idea how to date an inscription.
And for all that the humanists, not excepting Aventinus himself, managed to nd their own winding path into error. Renaissance scholars often display the same combination of severity and suggestibility that we nd two centuries later in Giambattista Vico, who derided the "unclear, frivolous, inept, conceited, and ridiculous" opinions of other scholars on the origins of languages, and then went on to assert that the most ancient peoples had spoken a natural, nonarbitrary language and that this was the language of Atlantis, just as Plato had said; or who dismissed as "groundless, inappropriate, or simply false" the views of other authorities on the reasons for the monstrous stature of ancient giants, but was himself completely con dent of the historical reality of giants. 8 Fifteenthand sixteenth-century scholars were peculiarly prone to credulity, as if archaeology itself, the epochal turn to material evidence as a supplement to oral and textual authority, only led them to ever more wonderful and lucid errors.
Credulity was the matrix of creativity. Ernst Gombrich, in one of his most ingenious essays, associated Leon Battista Alberti and Filippo Brunelleschi's reform of architecture with Poggio Bracciolini and Coluccio Salutati's invention of the minuscule script. 9 In both cases, the modern-pointing innovations were grounded in what Ingrid Rowland calls an "antiquarianism of false premises." 10 Just as the Florentine scribes had modeled their antiqua alphabet on Carolingian precedents, so too did the pioneering architect Filippo Brunelleschi select as his paragons the Baptistery and the basilica of SS. Apostoli, both eleventhcentury structures. 11 For his own S. Lorenzo (begun 1421), as Gombrich and others have shown, Brunelleschi borrowed from SS. Apostoli not only the plan but the Romanesque device of arches resting directly on columns. The entablature blocks he interposed between capital and arch, meanwhile, were derived from the exterior of the Baptistery. 12 Alberti styled his façade for S. Maria Novella (begun ca. 1458), with its corner pillars with horizontal incrustations and blind arcades, after the Baptistery and the façade of the twelfth-century basilica of S. Miniato al Monte. 13 Throughout the fteenth century, the most archaeologically minded and antiquity-oriented architects were as attentive to local pre- Gothic churches as they were to ancient ruins. 14 The paradox was explained already by Giorgio Vasari, who, following two centuries of commentary, described the Baptistery as a "most ancient temple" and went on to argue that because the architects of medieval buildings like SS. Apostoli had emulated the "good antique order" that they had found in the Baptistery, Brunelleschi was therefore justi ed in taking SS. Apostoli as his model. 15 Gombrich's paradoxical argument stripped the narrative of the rebirth of antiquity of some its revolutionary grandeur. He showed how a pedantic compulsion to emend could yield serendipitous results. Yet despite Gombrich's warning, modern scholars have found few ways to describe creative misidenti cations of old forms and artifacts other than as errors. Things only get worse when the Renaissance scholars gure not merely as passive gulls, but as active forgers, interventionists within the monumental record. For it is the case that humanist scholars in this period actually fabricated facts. The epigraphers copied many dozens of fascinating but inauthentic texts into their sylloges, or anthologies of classical inscriptions. 16 The early sylloges included the epitaphs of Lucretia, Caesar, and Lucan, and much else of little historical value. Most syllogists knew which texts were "good" and which were not. 17 Still, the ultimate truth content of a given tradition was never quite clear. Scholarship often drifted into a disorienting middle ground where the fabricated supplements to fact could cycle back and become corroborating testimony to their own reality, especially before the era of print (which antiquarians entered alarmingly late). 18 Confusingly, some of the pseudepigraphic texts, as well as inscriptions recorded in classical texts such as Livy, had been carved in stone in modern times. But such stones would have been hard to date on stylistic grounds alone. 19 The last to see the epitaph of Lucan-M.A. Lucano Cordubensi poete bene cio Neronis Caesaris fama servata, someone's outright invention-was the Florentine philologist Pietro Crinito (1475-1507), who reported that it was done in priscis litteris, "ancient letters." 20 Through repetition, circulation, and association with material evidence, such ludic contrivances could take on a specious factual existence. Huius Nympha Loci was a modern poem, devised perhaps as early as the 1460s by the humanist Giovanni Antonio Campani, invoking the classical and pastoral topos of a girl sleeping near water. The poem then appeared in the anthology of ancient inscriptions compiled by Michael Fabricius Ferrarinus in the 1470s or 1480s, together with the explana-tion that the poem had been found super ripam Danuvii, above the banks of the Danube, inscribed on a tablet and accompanied by a statue of a sleeping nymph. 21 From that point on the inscription and the statue were handed on from sylloge to sylloge, often accompanied by a drawing of the statue. The Danubian location was remote enough that no one would bother to check-that was part of the joke. In Rome, the pseudoantique poem and statue fell into a mutually corroborating relation with a family of real statues of recumbent sleeping females, ancient and modern. The most celebrated was the Ariadne, known in the Renaissance as Cleopatra, a Roman copy of a second-century BCE Pergamene original, rst recorded in the Maffei collection at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Pope Julius II acquired the work in 1512 and mounted it in the Belvedere as a fountain. 22 The statue and another like it, now lost, served as the basis for modern copies and adaptations. 23 The humanist scholar Angelo Colocci, for example, installed a nude version of the sleeping nymph together with the inscribed poem as a fountain in his garden on the Pincio. Eventually inscription and statue entered into the published sylloges ( g. 3) . 24 Print recreated the modern work as a "false antiquity." 25 Meanwhile, the symbiosis of statue and poem was extended in drawings and paintings by Albrecht Dürer and Lucas Cranach, who as Danubians, more or less, claimed a proprietory relationship. . 27 The woodcut in fact reproduces the reverse of a self-portrait by the Venetian medallist Giovanni Boldù (d. before 1477). 28 Bizarrely, the man, the child, and the skull are labelled in the woodcut reproduction Cloto, Lachesis, and Atropos, i.e., the Three Fates. 29 Celtis was apparently not the only one to overestimate the composition's antiquity. In the 1490s the sculptor Cristoforo Solari transposed the composition to a marble medallion and mounted it on the façade of the Certosa di Pavia, alongside other antiquities, including copies of Roman coins as well as the medallic portrait of Emperor Constantine, the famous "remake" of a nonexistent late antique object. 30 On his travels Celtis was constantly detecting traces of the presence of the Druids, the ancient priestly caste that supposedly brought religion to the Germans from Greece: forest monasteries, pentagrams stamped on Frankish coins, echoes of Greek in the modern German language; identi cations that were received with interest and respect by such authorities as Johannes Aventinus, his own pupil.
31 If Celtis's numismatic discoveries muddle pagan and neopagan iconographies, then his pursuit of the Druids among the Germanic antiquities points to a comparable period confusion surrounding medieval artifacts.
Conrad Celtis was a voyager in that middle territory of semibelief, where scholarship appealed to the power of suggestion and to the charisma of names and associations. His historiographical and icono- graphical inquiries were guided by his poetic imagination. Like his contemporary Annius of Viterbo, the Dominican historian, Celtis was also something of a con dence man, a Hochstapler. But these are complicated states of mind, not simple ones. Whatever traces of recent fabrication the Italian medal or the Frankish coins might have borne, Celtis believed that the modern artifacts reliably transmitted the essential content of their ancient prototypes. He felt licensed, or even compelled, to assign the works their "correct" iconographic labels. And this is the thesis that will be advanced in this essay: antiquarian error in this period was often just a matter of "looking through" the recentness of the artifact to a referential target far behind it and so to its true meaning.
The turn to material evidence was one of the keys to the development of modern historical consciousness, as Arnaldo Momigliano, Roberto Weiss, Francis Haskell, Alain Schnapp, Ingo Herklotz, and many others have demonstrated. 32 Material relics of the past furnished a powerful rhetorical counterweight to the authority of texts. In a sense, the scholars were only following the lead of the clerics, who had been manipulating relics for centuries in their battles with oblivion. 33 But the imagination is not cooled by relics, it is heated. J. B. Trapp, who wrote perceptively on the bogus tombs of the Roman poets, spoke of "learned credulity," and with this phrase suggested that the errors of the fteenth-and sixteenthcentury antiquarians were not simply missteps, but were in some sense a function of the new erudition. 34 Learned credulity, in this view, was neither a regressive holdover nor a weakness of mind, but a phenomenon catalyzed by antiquarianism itself.
The facile "enlightened" view of the history of scholarship as a progressive illumination of darkness obstructed only by fools or knaves-a view voiced by Edward Gibbon himself when he described his seventeenthcentury predecessors as "antiquarians of profound learning and easy con dence," 35 implying that the true enemy of critical scholarship was a self-serving and superstitious religiosity-has until recently dominated the historical study of the origins of modern scholarship. For if truth be told, neither Roberto Weiss in his Renaissance Discovery of Classical Antiquity nor Francis Haskell in his History and Its Images had anything really interesting to say about antiquarian credulity. In histories of scholarship, iconographic misadventures such as Celtis's too often gure as incompletenesses or delays in the development of modern archaeological and philological method, no more, no less. Yet one must hesitate before regretting or dismissing the "double think" 36 of the scholars as bad faith or crass opportunism. There is a way to redescribe these episodes in period terms, and precisely not in the terms of those critical disciplines that were only just emerging in the Renaissance and were not institutionalized and internalized until the nineteenth century.
I would like to review several recent and imaginative approaches to learned credulity that avoid simple condemnation or judgment in modern terms; and then offer my own structural explanation for the credulity of the Renaissance archaeologists. That explanation aims at validity beyond local circumstances and may therefore possibly contribute to a systematic, nontrivial comparison of European antiquarianism with patterns of scholarly inquiry in China and elsewhere.
The rst of the recent approaches I wish to identify might be called the "poetic" or "romantic" model, following the lead of Charles Mitchell, who in a well-known essay of 1960 brought out the fanciful, enthusiastic dimension of Quattrocento erudition, showing for example how readily Cyriac of Ancona fell into a fervent, "goliardic"-that is, ludic and festive-worship of Mercury; or with what ingenuity Felice Feliciano invented monumental frames for the inscriptions he discovered. 37 Scholarship, Mitchell showed, owed smoothly into ornamentalizing play. Indeed, one is struck by how readily a suggestive sequence of carved letters triggered the supplementing imaginations of the scholars. The Venetian scholar Marin Sanudo (in the account of Roberto Weiss), "on being shown by the local humanist Giusto dei Giusti the inscription with the name L. VITRVVIVS on the arch of the Gavi, which was locally believed to have been part of the Arena [of Verona], jumped to the conclusion that this Vitruvius, whom he felt certain was the great architect, had also been responsible for the building of it." 38 Scholarship was a matter of lling out the bare skeleton of antique remains. To charge scholars like Celtis with credulity, Mitchell taught, is to misunderstand that imagination was inextricable from scholarship. Mitchell pointed out that later antiquarians appreciated this: the sixteenth-century antiquarian Antonio Agustin despised clumsy forgeries, but admired clever practitioners like Annius of Viterbo and Pirro Ligorio. 39 Mitchell's approach unfolds into the more recent, and still more sophisticated, analyses of Leonard Barkan, who in his book Unearthing the Past shows how Renaissance archaeology became a framework for poetic storytelling about objects and origins, dovetailing in the rst decades of the sixteenth century with the emergence of a culture of art. 40 From this point of view, the errors of the antiquaries were not errors at all, but rather friction produced by the interference between scholarly culture and aesthetic culture at the very moment when the modern boundar-ies between the two realms were rst established. The "poetic" model of antiquarian credulity in the Renaissance indeed always emerges in close proximity to works of art, whether poems, pictures, ef gies, or temples. The poem is fundamentally a time-bending machine, as Thomas Greene's profound study of Renaissance intertextuality showed, and for that very reason is seldom mistaken for a document. 41 The poets knew to work with and not against anachronism-learned to make a virtue out of the condition of intertextuality, in other words. The work of visual art, however, was frequently expected, in late medieval and Renaissance culture, to double as a historical document. The confusions we have been detecting around artifacts were generated by the interference between the documentary and aesthetic identities of the artifact.
Until those identities had been sorted out-if they ever have beenpoetry occupied a special niche within the archaeological imagination. Frequent were the reports of discoveries of the tombs of the ancient poet. A stone inscribed T. LIVIVS was unearthed in Padua around 1320 and immediately hailed as the tomb of the historian, a native son. A century later his bones were found in a sarcophagus very near the nd-site of the inscription. 42 In 1508 a cleric of Bratislava, Leonhard Creutzer, reported the excavation of the tomb of Ovid in Szombathely, out tted with six stone lamps and two plates engraved with verses, though Creutzer could not remember what they said. 43 The tomb of the poet was the point of intersection of archaeological and aesthetic cultures.
A second model that attempts to contextualize antiquarian misdatings and mischief might be designated the "forgers as critics" model, following the lead of Anthony Grafton, who wrote an in uential short book with a similar title. Grafton argued that forgers like Annius of Viterbo were manipulating the same sets of skills that honest scholars were developing to work with ancient texts. The passive and active approaches to the past, in other words, were symmetrical. Annius helped establish the binding rules for the choice and evaluation of sources. "A forger emerges," Grafton wrote, "as the rst really modern theorist of critical reading of historians-a paradox that only a reader with a heart of stone could reject." 44 This paradigm applies not only to Annius's philological work, but also to his archaeological projects. Annius announced around 1492 the "discovery" of a cache of "vases, bronzes, and marbles incised with old letters" near Viterbo. 45 The faked nds became the archaeological basis for Annius's extravagant theses, which he published only a few years later-in the form of counterfeited texts attributed to the Chaldean sage Berosus-on the earliest history of Europe, involving the postdiluvian movements of Noah, his progeny, and the Egyptian gods. The most puzzling of Annius's archaeological fabrications is the so-called marmo osiriano, an ornamental lunette in a frame-not a forgery, in fact, but a found object ( g. 5). 46 This object was not part of the staged "excavation"; rather, it could be seen by anyone, Annius reported, in the Cathedral, which naturally was once a Temple of Hercules: "Our forefathers . . . in order to keep the eternal memory of the antiquity of this city before our eyes, placed before the rostra a columnula, that is, an alabaster tablet, monument to the triumph of Osiris." 47 The lunette, with vines, birds, and a lizard, sits in a rectangular frame with two classical-looking pro le heads in the corners. Annius interpreted the monument as a fragment of a triumphal column left in Viterbo by Osiris, the Egyptian god. He argued that the pro le heads in the spandrel represented Osiris and his cousin Sais Xantho, a muse. This was proof that Osiris really had been to Italy. The birds and other objects in the vines in the lunette were sacred Egyptian letters symbolizing the historical encounter between the Italians, the Giants, and the Egyptians. 48 Annius can be forgiven for mistaking the lunette with its twisted vines and animal symbols for an antiquity, for modern scholarship judged it a late Roman artifact until 1927, when Pietro Toesca dated it to the twelfth century. The frame with the pro le heads, meanwhile, belongs to more modern times, though it is not clear which times. 49 It was by no means unreasonable for Annius to mistake the frame, even if less than a hundred years old, for an antiquity. The whole ensemble was strange-looking and hard to assimilate to any contemporary iconography or function. And as with the Celtis nds, there is no evidence of any doubt on the part of contemporaries. Even Giorgio Vasari two generations later adduced "the statues found at Viterbo" as evidence of the high quality of Etruscan sculpture. 50 Grafton's point was that Annius was in many ways an exemplary textual editor. By the same token, he was a gifted archaeologist. Annius believed in inscriptions, artifacts, and names rather than authorities: things, rather than what people said about them. 51 He resented the prestigious textual authorities, among them the ancient Roman historians, who contradicted his version of things, mistrusting their literariness, their rhetoric. 52 Annius struck back by inventing a purer ancient source to con rm what he knew was true, and preempted skepticism by planting solid archaeological evidence in the ground.
"Retroactive" monuments like Annius's marmo osiriano are best un-derstood in the context of medieval document forgery, a well-researched and well-understood phenomenon. 53 Medieval historians and clerks generated an enormous quantity of forged documents that came to carry real legal force. Forgery ourished in proximity to power. A famous case in point is the fantastical genealogical tree dreamt up by the Habsburg Emperor Maximilian's court historians Ladislaus Suntheim and Jakob Mennel. 54 The scholar Johannes Trithemius invented an entire source, Hunibald, to prove the genealogical connection between the Trojans and the Franks. 55 To be sure, many document forgers were simply cynical opportunists. Medieval scholars and jurists were quite capable of applying rationalist criteria in accepting or rejecting evidence. 56 But it has also been argued that concepts of the authenticity of a document are historically relative and that medieval forgers were simply playing by the rules of their own time. It is argued, for example, that the overriding framework of salvational justi cation provided a legitimating context for document forgery, that the deceit was a "pious fraud" (pia fraus); or it is argued that such deceits were justi ed by a traditional, popular sense of fairness (aequitas) which transcended any simply binary opposition between the true and the false document. 57 With documents, the intent to deceive outright is dif cult to disentangle from the desire to establish and publicize historical or legal precedents that were simply known to have been real even if the original material indexes of those precedents had gone astray. The forger, rational and irrational at once, thought "doubly." The forger offered the fabricated documents as a legitimate substitute for an absent document that must have existed. To fabricate a document was just to complete a paper record that was incomplete only by accident, unfairly. If a tradition was old enough-custom beyond memory-then there was an almost irresistible tendency to believe it. 58 The fabrication of a corroborating charter or artifact would have appeared to many a routine bureaucratic procedure. The mosaic of sources had a number of author-sized gaps in it; why not ll them with characters like Berosus or Hunibald?
A third recent approach treats scholarly error in the context of mythic thought. Credulity, in this paradigm, is an effect generated by a mismatch between scholarly and mythical thinking. Myth is a narrative coding of a culture's cosmology and rst principles. The ancient historian Paul Veyne in his brilliant book Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? sketched out an ancient intellectual world of "plural truths," an open competition of myths that made perfect sense according to its own internal rules and even made room for what Veyne called the scholarly practice of "critical credulity." 59 Veyne's model is adaptable to Renaissance culture. As Frank Borchardt demonstrated in his book German Antiquity in Renaissance Myth, the critical historiography of the fteenth and sixteenth centuries was often just a matter of one myth replacing another. Although Renaissance scholars were quick to condemn the errors of their predecessors, they were apt to replace those errors with more errors. Borchardt called this process the "topos of critical rejection," or, to give it its period name, anasceva, or "dismantling." Borchardt argued that scholars were reluctant to dismantle a tradition and leave nothing in its place. 60 That is, they were neither satis ed with Veyne's "plural truths" nor willing to face a past completely unstructured by myth. 61 Because myth and written history share the same narrative structure, they are easily knitted together into a common fabric. Cosmogonies or myths of national origins were frequently retained, in this period, as a prelude to more recent and better documented histories. The initiated could easily detect the seam between myth and history, perhaps tacitly sanctioning the mythic prologue through a euhemeristic assumption, that is, the theory that heroic or fabulous narratives were rooted in real but forgotten events. Other readers allowed myth and history to ow into one another. "Credulity" was a way of reading.
In modernity, the concept of myth names a ight from the rule of fact. Myth narrates poetically and so becomes the recourse of those who are unconvinced that linear sequences of documents or artifacts can tell the whole story; or of those unwilling to adapt human existence to a historical narrative "fenced in by the cardinal mysteries" of beginnings and endings, as Wolfgang Iser has put it. 62 For cultures deprived of the framework of meaning provided by, at one end, etiological myths and, at the other, prophecy-i.e., devices that unlock those cardinal mysteriesmust be prepared to take seriously the mere events of human history. Iser argues that such cultures develop literature and art, ctional reenactments of life, as compensations for the loss of its cosmogonies and eschatologies. The credulous early modern scholar, then, is that seeker of origins who is already beyond myth but not yet ready to surrender to art. Giambattista Vico, who grasped the power of "poetic wisdom," found himself in just that predicament, still protesting deep into the eighteenth century the dogma of fact established by the Renaissance scholars. But this also made him the rst to anticipate the modern rebellion, initiated by Nietzsche, against historical reason.
Each of these three accounts of learned credulity in the Renaissance identi es a mixing of categories that in modernity are notionally kept distinct: historical scholarship is compromised, in the rst instance, by the poetical or aesthetic imagination; in the second by propagandistic or doctrinal ends; and in the third by mythic thinking.
I would like to offer still another account of early modern scholarly credulity, here too attempting to overcome what Grafton calls the "dis-tressingly rectilinear" rationalist accounts. 63 In this account, the temporal instability of historical artifacts follows from their mutual substitutability in the imagination of the antiquarian. The basic premise behind any premodern use of artifacts as documents was the membership of the artifact within a typological class. 64 These classes were structured as chains of artifacts connected to a common source and succeeding and substituting for one another across time. In general, premodern culture coped with de cits of authority by inventing chains that ran backward to a remote, identity-granting origin. If the true meaning of a word was desired, etymology would yield the answer; if a family required a new basis for its hold on power, the genealogist built a chain. 65 The chain of substitutions stretching out behind any given artifact was, in practice, invisible and unreconstructible. The argument is not that production (of paintings, sculptures, or buildings) was in reality guided by constant reference to a stable origin-point. Substitution was rather the theory of production that guided the perception, interpretation, and use of artifacts. 66 Substitution was a theory about the production and transmission of artifacts that allowed people to work with evidence under the tacit awareness that material vehicles did sometimes need to be replaced or repaired, that messages on material vehicles did sometimes need to be reinscribed or redrawn, and that messages could even be copied to a new vehicle altogether, just as texts were copied from manuscript to manuscript. Archaeological thinking is in principle the opposite of substitutional thinking, in that archaeology has decided not to accept passively the written text's claim to be the endpoint of an invisible but reliable process of transmission and therefore a trustworthy source of information. But in its eagerness to improve upon the poor evidence of texts, early archaeology accepted bad material evidence, and so ended up, paradoxically, repeating patterns of reception proper to the substitutional model. Lorenzo Valla, for instance, pointed out in his treatise on the Donation of Constantine that the evidence produced by the Papacy in favor of the Donation's authenticity was all textual. Why there was no corresponding, clinching material evidence, he wondered, challenging the papal advocates: "I should have expected you to show gold seals, marble inscriptions, a thousand authors," he wrote. "This Donation of Constantine," he went on, "so magni cent and astounding, can be proved by no document at all, whether on gold or on silver, or on bronze or on marble or, nally, in books, but only, if we believe that man, on paper or parchment." 67 Valla's statements imply that he would have been convinced of the Donation's reality if such a material copy could be found-as if that copy, untested by any science of historical epigraphy, would have proven anything. Valla's protests were partly ironic. He did not really consider the absence of material evidence decisive proof of the Donation's falsity. Nevertheless his remarks reveal his assumption that evidence transmitted by metal or stone was superior to evidence transmitted by paper. Scholars in Valla's time, presented with a material artifact, tended to underrate the possibility of an unreliable or wandering transmission and instead to presume a strong connection between the artifact and its referent. That underrating of the vagaries of material transmission was the very basis in Valla's century for the evidentiary force of artifacts. Archaeology is thought of as the discipline that overcomes the layers of mediation that separate us from the past. But early archaeology, to the extent that its preference for the material depended on an optimistic faith in transmission, was actually working with mediation.
The substitutable artifact par excellence was the painted icon, the portrait of a holy personage claiming a direct link back to ancient times. 68 Valla, while dismissing the spurious Lentulus letter, an eyewitness account of the appearance of Christ, came to discuss a famous Roman painting: "Similarly, although there are ten thousand instances of this kind at Rome, among the sacred objects are displayed the portraits of Peter and Paul on a panel which Sylvester put on show, when those apostles had appeared to Constantine in a dream, as a con rmation of the vision." Valla's point was to cast doubt on the legend that the panel was miraculously produced as a con rmation of a vision by Emperor Constantine. But, signi cantly, Valla does not doubt the portraits themselves: "I do not say this because I deny those portraits of the apostles exist. I wish that Lentulus's letters about the image of Christ were as authentic. . . . But I say what I say because that panel was not shown by Sylvester to Constantine. In this matter I cannot restrain my astonishment." 69 When it came to painted icons, in other words, Valla dropped his critical guard. He was ready to believe that the icons were substitutionally linked to their referents. The portrait of god, saint, or king, the relief sculpture, the tomb, and the round temple all succeeded in concretizing a past that was otherwise ghostly and obscure. Reference, once recognized, appeared ancient, inevitable, incontrovertible. A monumental shaping of the past, no matter how spurious, had a powerful placebo effect on the imagination of the beholder.
Earlier we noted that artifacts generate their own temporalities that disable any easy coupling with histories of texts. The substitutional model is still another way of explaining why archaeology was out of sync with philology in this period, and why antiquarianism retained its systematic and nonnarrative character for so long. 70 The hypothesis of mutually substitutable links in a referential chain explains how white vine scroll and the minuscule alphabet, no matter how recent the manuscripts that transmitted them, were held to have preserved the ancient ways of bookmaking; or how the strange iconographies of the medals found by Conrad Celtis could have been understood as antique. The hypothesis of substitutability shows how Brunelleschi was able to look through the eleventh-and twelfth-century buildings of Florence to the true meanings hiding behind them, the good form of ancient Roman building. Brunelleschi understood the meaning of SS. Apostoli or the Baptistery to be a referential quantum preserved across a chain of artifacts, some prior and now lost sequence of intermediary buildings leading from antiquity to the eleventh century. Any knowledge that one happened to possess about the particular or local circumstances of the building's absolute position within a chain of imitations was not allowed to interfere with the referential linkage and the presumption of substitutability. Brunelleschi probably knew that his models were in an important sense "medieval." 71 But they substituted for the missing ancient models that he really wanted. Neither architects nor scholars were capable of a philology of architecture that might have distinguished building fabrics and served as the basis for a reconstruction of building histories. The identity of the building was for them its meaning, not its physical being, which distended complexly across time and was for any practical purpose unreconstructible.
The chronicler Filippo Villani reported in 1330 that the Florentine Baptistery had once been a temple of Mars and that Christianization had brought only minor changes. 72 It is not clear whether Villani meant that the present Baptistery replaced an ancient temple, or whether his culture had forgotten after two and a half centuries when the present Baptistery was actually built and believed that it was in fact the ancient temple itself, reconsecrated and refurnished. But that ambiguity is typical. The distinction between "being" an old building and "replacing" an earlier building is never quite drawn. It may therefore simply be unhelpful to ask whether Brunelleschi or for that matter Vasari really thought that the Baptistery was executed in pre-Christian times. They believed that it stood in a reliable substitutional relationship to some original pagan building on that site, and that was enough.
A few period voices actually spelled out the principle of substitution. Annius of Viterbo, justifying his own faith in the marmo osiriano, admitted the possibility that it was only a replacement of a lost original: "Whether this is truly the tablet," he wrote in his Commentaries, "or a substitute for it-the original having collapsed through age-we cannot yet be certain. Either way, we consider the tablet to have survived." (An vero haec illa sit, an ei vetustate labenti, ad eius exemplar suffecta, nondum compertum habemus. Existimamus tamen eandem permanere. 73 ) Walter Stephens calls this a "doctrine of congruence": any inscription, no matter when fabricated, could be defended as a substituted copy of a lost original. Equally revealing are the arguments that the scholar Vincenzo Borghini in 1565-67 assembled in defence of the tradition of Florence's antiquity. 74 Borghini adduced the Baptistery as evidence, but acknowledged that many experts considered the building's polychrome marble revetment to have been applied in the middle ages. To meet this objection Borghini explicitly introduced a substitutional model of architectural history: he argued that the revetment imitated an earlier decorative scheme on the same building and thus reliably re ected antiquity. 75 Substitutional thinking is compatible with-may even encourage-a normative approach to the achievements of the past. Gombrich showed that scribes and architects alike were more interested in reforming what they saw to be a corrupted traditions than in seeking out what might be today considered the historical identity of their models. They wanted good models, not necessarily old models; and they took their models where they could nd them. 76 The strictly historical study of architecture was overwhelmed by the normative imperative.
Virtual or desired transmission chains were generated through triages of essential and accidental features. The Florentine architects saw only those features of the Romanesque basilicas they wished to see and ignored the rest. Only the essential, the supposed links to Rome, "made it through," while all the rest was dismissed as merely accidental. What looks like error to modern eyes is just the drawing of a different internal frontier between the constitutive and the contingent. The fantastical frame drawn around a real inscription in a fteenth-century sylloge is ignored by the modern epigrapher as a useless and misleading supplement. But that is precisely because the modern scholar considers the material support of the inscription to be good evidence about the past, potentially as important as the content of the text. The Renaissance antiquarian was slow to arrive at this idea.
Renaissance antiquarian credulity was therefore the result of a clash between two models of the production of artifacts: on the one hand, the substititional model, that underrates the transmission process; and on the other hand, the archaeological, that reads every artifact as an inalienable trace of its originary point and therefore as a powerful threat to textual authority. They are two competitive models of artifact production, two incompatible conceptions of the origins of artifacts, each with its own internal truth. The nefarious or farcical aspects of Annius's Viterbo "excavation," take your pick, are only a dramatic projection of the deep-structural interference between the substitutional and archaeological paradigms; as if all the latent contradictions of late fteenth-century antiquarianism were exposed in one scholar's project. The archaeological preference for material relics over texts and the mystical con dence in the mutual substitutability of artifacts across time collided, but held their ground, in Annius's mind. Archaeology made Celtis and Annius possible by tempting them into an overzealous imposition of the substitution model onto recent objects, into the imagining or fabricating of links in nonexistent chains. The power of the artifact translated the scholar back into the very frame of mind, confused and credulous, that scholarship was trying to overcome. Celtis and Annius were accidental artists, in the sense that they fell upon the truth of the anachronism of the artifact, its capacity to bend time. But they exercised their creativity within the wrong paradigm, scholarship instead of art, and so it came to resemble either folly or crime. For archaeology over the course of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries found its identity in the struggle to cancel out the noise and distortion of transmission. Error, in that same period, was tamed and caged within the institution of art. Only artists were allowed to make error their project. The scholars, meanwhile, found themselves liberated into an unending dialectic of critique. Modern scholarship has de ned itself precisely against such doubled thinking. The empiricist algorithm locates its own origins in an overcoming of the participatory and divided consciousness. Empiricism is so fundamentally invested in a primal selfdifferentiation from forgery that when it doubles back on itself and tries to perceive its own historical origins, it loses its capacity for objectivity.
Before long the rinascimento dell'antichità was itself receding into the past, its achievements especially in scholarship and in the visual arts benchmarks for later generations, then as now. From the perspective of the later sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, that rst and most creative Renaissance, the Renaissance of the humanists, took on a prestigious threshold character, at once facing backward to the deep past and forward to the modern era. In this way, some archaeological ctions of the Renaissance entered into a strange second career, retaining their referential, documentary force, their rapport with antiquity, even as they were fully grasped as fabrications of the moderns.
An example of such an illogical retrospective appeal to a Renaissance "document" appears in the discussion of the origins of Montepulciano by Spinello Benci, a seventeenth-century historian. The Renaissance sculptor Andrea Sansovino had modelled in terracotta a colossal portrait of Lars Porsenna, the semilegendary king of the sixth century BCE; according to Vasari the work was commissioned by the citizens of Montepulciano. 77 The portrait participated in the interurban Tuscan rivalry that for some decades had hinged on claims to Etruscan origins. The socalled "sepulchre of Lars Porsenna" at Chiusi, in fact the ruins of an ancient hydraulic engineering system, was investigated by Alberti, Filarete, Peruzzi, and Antonio da Sangallo. The Florentine cleric Lorenzo Dati composed a fanciful chronicle, the Historia Porsennae, posing as a translation of an Etruscan text by one Caio Vibenna. 78 In 1492 the Sienese presented the funerary urn of Lars Porsenna, inscribed conveniently in Latin, to Lorenzo de' Medici. The fteenth century knew Etruscan civilization mainly through the textual accounts of the Romans, and everyone wanted more. 79 The Montepulcian colossus intervened in this story, lling a portrait-sized gap in the monumental record. Sansovino did not conceal his authorship, nor was it forgotten; still, the artist chose a prestigious and rare format, the colossus, and an unconventional medium for such a colossus, terracotta, lending the gure an archaic avor. A terracotta bust, 46 cm. in height, only recently resurfaced in a private collection, seems to match the accounts by Vasari and others. 80 It would be dif cult to attribute it to Sansovino without those notices; indeed it was still judged an antiquity by Luigi Lanzi in the late eighteenth century. Sansovino's colossus had evidently already been reduced to a bust when Spinello Benci, secretary to the Medici, cited and reproduced it in woodcut as the frontispiece to his history of Montepulciano of 1641 ( g. 6). 81 Benci knew that Sansovino was the author of the statue; he describes it as a "memorial" erected by the town to its founder. And yet the work gures in his account almost as if it were contributing to the claim, dear to him, of an ancient Etruscan presence in Montepulciano. It was as if the fact that the citizens of Montepulciano had commissioned a memorial in the early sixteenth century rendered the myth of Etruscan origins a little more probable. The folk of the sixteenth century, after all, were just that much closer to antiquity, or so Benci implies; the old traditions were perhaps still intact then, the invisible lines of communication to the deepest past still open. Modernity, by contrast, our own mid-seventeenth century, Benci seems to be saying, is forever cut off from the living past and has to make do with mere scholarship. It is worth wondering why a three-dimensional "forgery" like Sansovino's was-perhaps still is-more effective than Lorenzo Dati's obviously ctitious chronicle. The sculpted document activates the magic of guration. The history of archaeology is also a history of works, and for that reason can never quite be assimilated to the rest of the history of scholarship.
